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ABSTRACT
This study explored conflicts arising before clients and agency mergers in the
advertising industry. First a proper definition of the type of conflicts was discussed as
well as some policies and accommodations to solve these conflicts. Specially the
American Association of Advertising Agencies (A.A.A.A.) policy and the umbrella"
concept were mentioned.
Three client mergers were studied: Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Richardson
Vicks; Philip Morris' purchase of General Foods; and R. J. Reynolds' acquisition of
Nabisco. It was found that P&G and R. J. R. had a very strict policy on conflicts,
although P&G did not apply it in a consistent manner. Philip Morris, on the other hand,
allowed its agencies to continue working with competing products.
Two agency megamergers were discussed: the Omnicom Merger, and the Saatchi-
Bates Merger. Most of the conflicts found in this section were of direct competing
products in an umbrella company. It was found that most of the conflicts were resolved
by one of the clients dismissing the agency, or the agency withdrawing one of the
accounts. However, while almost all the conflicts n the two mergers were solved in
this fashion, the Omnicom Group was able to retain more directly competing accounts.
An important reason may be that the Saatchi & Saatchi Group was less concerned about
the clients than the Omnicom Group.
Finally, It was found that the umbrella concept was not followed by most of the
clients. Also, the A. A. A. A. conflict policy was to narrow In most of the cases and
needed to be modified to include cases of conglomerate competition.
Thesis Supervisor: Alvin J. Silk
Title: Professor of Business Administration
-2-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNT CONFLICTS ........................................... 6
1.1 Nature of the Problem ................................. 6
1.2 Issues in Defining Account Conflicts ......................................... 9
-A Policy for Client-Agency Conflicts .............. 9.....................9
-Type of Account Conflicts ................................................... 10
-Accommodations to Account Conflicts ................................. 11
1.3 Purpose of this Thesis ................................................... 13
1.4 Rationale for Studying Account Conflicts that Arise from
Client and Agency Merger .................................. 13
1.5 Organization of this Thesis ................................................... 14
2. ADVERTISER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS .................................... 16
2.1 Procter & Gamble ................................................... 17
-Procter & Gamble Conflict Policy .................................................. 18
A) Procter & Gamble Conflicts after Merging with
Richardson Vicks ................................................................ 19
B) Procter & Gamble Conflicts after the Saatchi &
Saatchi Merger with Bates . ...................................... 24
2.2 Philip Morris ................................................... 28
A) Philip Morris Conflicts after Merging with General
Foods ......................................................................................................30
B) Philip Morris Conflicts after the Saatchi & Saatchi
Merger with Bates ................................................... 33
2.3 R. J. Reynolds ................................................... 34
A) R. J. Reynolds Conflicts after Merging With Nabisco..37
B. RJR Conflicts after the Saatchi & Saatchi Merger
with Bates ................................................... 41
C) RJR Nabisco Conflicts after the BBDO-DDB-Needham
Merger ............................................................................ ........................42
2.4 Conclusion ................................................... 43
-3-
3. ADVERTISING AGENCIES MERGERS ............................................. 46
3.1 The Merger of Needham Harper, BBDO, and Doyle
Dane Bernbach ............................................. 47
-Conflicts after the Merger of BBDO, Doyle and
Needham ............................................. 48
A) General Mills Conflicts ............................................. 49
B) Campbell Soup Conflict ............................................. 50
C) Brewery Conflicts ............................................. 52
D) Automobile Conflicts ............................................. 53
E) Other Conflicts ............................................. 54
-Conclusion ................................................................................................... 55
3.2 The Merger of Saatchi & Saatchi with Ted Bates
Worldwide ..................................................................................................... 55
-Conflicts after the Merger of Bates with Saatchi &
Saatchi ............................................. 58
A) Mars Inc. Conflicts ............................................. 58
B) General Mills Conflicts ............................................. 59
C) Warner Lambert Conflicts . .................................... 60
D) Cigarette Conflicts ............................................. 61
E) Brewery Conflicts ............................................. 61
F) Automobile Conflicts ............................................. 63
G) Other Conflicts . ............................................ 64
Conclusion ............................................. 65
3.3 Concluding Remark s ............................................. 66
4. CONCLUSION ............................................. 68
4.1 Research Questions ............................................. 68
4.2 Recommendations ............................................................................. 72
4.3 Suggestions for Further Studies ............................................. 73
Bibliography ............................................... 75
-4-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Writing this thesis have been a good learning experience, and
will be very helpful for my future.
First, I want to give my thanks to the Sloan School of
Management for giving me the brilliant opportunity of attending
one of the best business schools in the world. The program will
make a great contribution to my career.
I want to give special thanks to Alvin Silk for his support, his
kindness, and all the time he spent with me helping me to improve
this thesis. His encouragement during all the process to guide me
to write a good thesis is appreciated. Also my thanks to Deborah
Marlino, for taking all the time to read this work.
Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis to my family in El
Salvador, for helping me achieve a Master's Degree from the M.I.T.
Sloan School of Management.
-5-
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNT CONFLICTS
1.1 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of account conflicts arises when a client does not
want its agency to work with competing accounts. Clients
disapprove agencies handling competing accounts for two reasons:
(1) To protect confidentiality of plans, strategy and proprietary
information, and (2) To assure exclusivity of agency services and
talent.
The prohibition of agencies to handle competitors had its
origins before 1912. For example, by around World War I, it was
generally established that agencies would not handle competitor
accounts.1 However, this topic has been relatively unstudied.
This restriction on handling competing accounts is very
problematic for agencies. Advertising agencies want to grow, and
1 Daniel Pope, The Making of Modern Advertising. New York: Basic Books, 1983,
pages 163-165.
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they do this by adding new or larger accounts. This norm of
avoiding handling conflicting accounts affects both the agencies
freedom to select clients and clients' freedom to select agencies.
This idea of merging agencies to allow agency to grow and get
around with the problem of "conflict", was originally developed by
Marion Harper. Harper was born in Oklahoma City in 1916 and
became president of McCann-Erickson in 1948. He helped a global
marketing strategy for Coca-Cola, and developed an organization to
serve Coke bottlers around the world. Harper was successful in
assisting Coca-Cola to increase its market share and won the
entire Coca-Cola account, worth $25 million in 1956 one of the
largest accounts at that time.2
Harper's strategy was to increase his agency's billings by
finding a way to get around the problem of conflicting accounts. He
did this by creating a holding company called Interpublic Inc.,
which was the parent company of McCann-Erickson and another
agency, Marschalk & Pratt, that McCann had acquired in 1954. In
February 1961, Interpublic acquired Pritchard Wood & Partners, a
major British ad agency. During the next two years, Interpublic
continued acquiring advertising agencies around the world. By the
fall of 1963, Interpublic had $413 million in billings, very close to
J. Walter Thompson, the U.S. leading advertising agency at that
time, with billings of about $420 million. 3
On October 1963, Interpublic acquired Erwin Wasey, with
billings of $83.5, and went ahead of world leader J. Walter
2 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, pages 39-
41.
3 bid., pages 41 and 42.
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Thompson. However, despite a continued growth in total billings,
the company got into financial problems in 1966 due to increasing
debt loads, and posted a $250,000 loss. In 1967, interpublic loss $4
million, and Marion Harper was replaced as president of the
company. 4
Despite Marion Harper's idea to get around conflicts, the
problem of account conflicts became very frequent in the 80's.
According to "A practical Solution to Client-Agency Account
Conflicts", there are three good reasons to seek solutions that are
good for both the agency and the client:
1- "A conflict can cause the disruption of a productive client-
agency relationship. The disruption of a relationship is a cost to
the advertising agency. However there are also consequences for
the firm, such as the expense to the client of re-educating new
personnel, the time lost in developing a new campaign, and the
momentum sacrificed while the change is being effected. Also, the
client is likely to find himself at a very real competitive
disadvantage , if the new agency is not as productive". 5
2- "It can seriously limit the creative talent that is available
to the client. Creative talent is valuable. Some limit on creative
availability to a client is unavoidable, but those limits should be
minimized to the maximum extent to give the client optimum
exposure and flexibility in securing this critical resource".6
3- "It can limit the potential for agency growth and it
penalizes accomplishment. Agency growth is important to the
4 ibid., pages 43-47.
5 !_bid., pages 43-47.
6 bid., pages 43-47.
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agency and the client. New challenges and diversity constantly
stimulate creative people to do their best work. Increased agency
resources allows an advertising agency to up-grade its staff, to
add new functions, and to keep pace with the progress an the needs
of its clients." 7
This problem is important since "account conflicts" cause
disruptions to good agency-client relations and can be costly in
real economic terms as clients drop agencies or agencies resign
accounts. Second, it limits the creative talent that is available to
a client. Finally, it breeds mutual distrust on part of both agencies
and clients and undermines "partnership" relations.
1.2 ISSUES IN DEFINING ACCOUNT CONFLICTS
A Policy For Client-Agency Conflicts
The Committee on Client Service of the American Association
of Advertising Agencies (A.A.A.A.) believes there is a simple and
effective policy which should be used:
"The practical client-agency policy on account conflicts is one
which is based on individual product category rather than the total
line of products of any given client. Under such a policy, an agency
would not handle products which are directly competitive for more
than one client, without the express permission of the clients. The
7 Ibid., pages 43-47.
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clients would permit the agency to represent other companies in
product areas beyond those it already serves, even if the clients is
involved in such areas with other agencies".8
Type of Account Conflicts
One of the problems in establishing and implementing a policy
on account conflicts, is the proper definition of "competition".
While both agencies and clients generally agree, that an agency
should not handle a "competitors' account", they do not always
interpret "competition" in the same way. At least three basic
views of competition may be invoked in addressing client-agent
account conflicts:
1- Direct Product Competition. If agency A handles the
toothpaste account of client X, then it should not handle the
toothpaste account of client Y. This is the policy advocated by the
A.A.A.A. which I just described.
2- Indirect Product Competition. If agency A handles the
toothpaste account of client X, then it should not handle the
mouthwash account of client Y, because toothpaste and mouthwash
are partial substitutes and, to some degree are competitive
products.
3- Conglomerate Competition.
a) Multiproduct Multidivision Clients.lf agency A handles the
toothpaste account of client X, then it should not handle the soap
account of client Y because either client Y also owns a toothpaste
8 Committee on Client Service, American Association of Advertising Agencies, A
Practical Solution to Client-Agency Account Conflicts, July 1979, pages 2 and 3.
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whose advertising is handled by agency B, or because client X also
owns a soap account handled by agency C, and toothpaste and soap
are in the same division of client X and/or Y.
b) Mega or Multinational Agencies.
(i) If agency A handles the toothpaste account of client X, then
agency A should not handle the toothpaste account of client Y
because agencies A & B are both owned by, or part of the same
mega-agency.
(ii) If agency A handles the toothpaste account of client X in
country 1, then the agency's wholly/partially owned
subsidiary/affiliate should not handle the toothpaste account of
client Y in country 2.
Accommodations to Account Conflicts
A popular approach advocated by agencies to avoid conflicts is
the "umbrella concept". This consists of the agencies acting as
corporate umbrellas with a number of separate, and often
autonomous, member agencies which allow a client to place
different parts of his business in several of them. These agencies
may be located in the same city or in different ones. This
separation is intended to allow the client to achieve
confidentiality and avoid conflicts, and the advertising agency to
handle competing accounts.9 This idea was originally developed
by Marion Harper as noted above.
Although agencies seek to avoid conflicts by employing the
9 lbid., page 5.
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"umbrella concept", advertisers often reject it because they adhere
to a policy, of avoiding "conglomerate competition". Many clients do
not believe the two agencies of an umbrella are going to be
operated separately. Advertisers still believe the two agencies are
part of the same company, and the agencies can interchange
confidential information about a company and give it to the
competitors. So this solution is not adequate enough to solve all
conflicts, as was evidenced by the account shifts after the
megamergers which be discussed in chapters two and three.
Other solutions used by the agencies to solve conflicts is to use
separate offices and to employ different teams. However, these
solutions still have the same problems as the umbrella company,
since companies fear the separate offices and/or different teams
can share confidential information and pass it to competitors.
A final solution to advertising mergers conflicts which is being
used is conflict insurance. This tool is being used by clients to
defend themselves against agency megamergers. Some companies
are pressing agencies to sign contracts ensuring financial
compensation should a merger disrupt the agency-client
relationship. In 1987, these indemnification clauses were added by
American Cyanamid Co.'s Shulton U.S.A. Division and Nissan Motor
Corp. U.S.A. in their agency agreements.1 0 Shulton signed the
contract with Scali, McCabe, Sloves, N.Y., and Carrafiello, Diehl &
Associates, Irvington, N.Y., while Nissan with Chiat/Day, Los
Angeles.
7' John Lafayette, "Advertisers Protect Against Shop Mergers", Advertising Age
(December 14, 1987), page 1.
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1.3 PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate "conflict" problems
that have arisen in connection with several recent mergers and
acquisitions involving large agencies and major advertisers.
There are a series of questions that I intend to answer in this
thesis. What type of "conflicts" arose? How were the conflict
resolved? Is there any relationship between the type of conflict
and the manner of resolution? Are there differences in the source
of conflicts between client vrs. agency mergers? Have consistent
policies on conflicts emerge? Do different clients follow the same
policy? Do different agencies follow similar policies? Were the
A.A.A.A. Policy guidelines or procedures followed in these cases?
'Why or why not? Are they workable or adequate to cover the
conflicts that arose? What are their weaknesses and limitations?
What modifications are needed?
1.4. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING ACCOUNT CONFLICTS
THAT ARISE FROM CLIENT AND AGENCY MERGERS
Account conflict became very common in the 1980's, when
there was a wave of mergers of advertising clients. The most
important which I will cover in this thesis were Procter and
-13-
Gamble's acquisition of Richardson Vicks, Philip Morris' purchase
of General Foods, and R. J. Reynolds' acquisition of Nabisco. These
mergers left many advertising agencies having several competing
clients.
Also in 1986, there were several advertising agency mergers.
The biggest which will be discussed later were the Omnicom
merger (BBDO-Needham and Doyle Dane Bernbach), and the Saatchi
& Saatchi acquisition of Ted Bates. These mergers created
numerous client conflicts, and billion of dollars in account shifts.
This wave of mergers makes the evaluation of account conflicts
very relevant. It is important to perform this study to see how the
conflicts were resolved, and determine if either the client policies
are too strict and need to be modified, or new solutions will be
needed to solve account conflicts in the future. It is also
interesting to find out if advertising agencies can continue to grow
through acquisitions.
To perform this study, I collected information from periodicals
and books. The three sources I used the most were: Advertising
Age, Adweek, and The Wall Street Journal. I also employed The
Standard Directory of Advertisers and The Standard Directory of
Advertising Agencies. The most important book utilized in this
thesis was Emperors of Adland by Nancy Millman.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS
In Chapter 2, three important clients mergers are discussed:
-14-
Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Richardson Vicks, Philip Morris'
acquisition of General Foods, and R. J. Reynolds' acquisition of
Nabisco. Chapter 3 examines two advertising agencies' mergers:
The Omnicom merger, and the Saatchi & Saatchi acquisition of Ted
Bates. The last chapter of this thesis will answer the questions
posed for study in section 1.3, and suggest recommendations to
both advertisers and agencies.
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CHAPTER 2
ADVERTISER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Procter & Gamble, Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco accounted for
10% of all national advertising spending in the United States in
1986 according to an analysis performed by the Newspaper
Advertising Bureau.1 1
In this chapter, I intend to study these three companies
relationships with their advertising agencies. First I will discuss
the companies, and the conflicts created when these corporations
acquired other firms. Then, I will analyze how the conflicts were
resolved. This chapter will end with a comparison of the policies
followed by these three advertisers, and how to predict the
outcome of a conflict based on these mergers.
11 Advertising Age Roundup, "The Mighty Urge to Merge", Advertising Age,
(October 26, 1985), page 1.
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2.1. PROCTER & GAMBLE
The first company which is important to discuss is Procter &
(Gamble. P&G was the largest U.S. advertiser in 1985, and has
spoken louder than any other company about mergers and conflicts.
P&G also used a variety of tactics to make it known its displeasure
with the megamergers agency combinations.
P&G is divided in five divisions. Please see table 2.1 for P&G
divisional chart.
Table 2.1
P&G Divisional Chart
Procter & Gamble
Soaps, Detergents Food Personal Care Household Coffee
& Household Cleaners Division Division Paper Division
Division Division
Richardson Vicks, a manufacturer of beauty and health care
products, accepted a friendly merger offer from Procter & Gamble
Co. (P&G). The offer was valued at $1.24 billion, and ended weeks
of battling to acquire Richardson Vicks.
The Procter & Gamble $69-a-share bid beat out a similar
proposal from Pitzer Inc. of New York and frustrated a hostile
takeover attempt by Unilever N.Y., a huge consumer packaged goods
-17-
company.
This acquisition gave P&G an immediate presence in areas of
health care that it has had difficulty entering on its own. It
improved P&G position into the $1.6 billion annual market for
nonprescription analgesic products. This acquisition represented a
change from P&G's traditional strategy of relying on internal
growth rather than on outside purchases. 12 Faced with declining
market share for its stronger brands, P&G reported in 1985 its
first drop in operating profits in 33 years.
Hug Zurkuhlen, an analyst at Salomon Bros., said, "The buyout of
1R-V is a good fit, both productwise and debtwise. R-V and P&G have
synergies in distribution and marketing channels, which will be
helpful to both companies. It appears, given P&G's (uneven) success
in new products, that it's easier to acquire existing products with
name recognition and market them heavily". 1 3
Procter & Gamble Conflict Policy
P&G's longstanding policy states that a conflict exists when an
agency handles any product anywhere that might compete with any
brand in the P&G division of the assigned product. P&G officials
have stated that this policy is "designed to keep agencies from
ending up in a compromising position. "14
P&G's conflict policy is a type of conglomerate competition,
12 John Williams and Michael Waldholz, "Vicks Board Accepts Friendly Bid From P&G
Totalling $1.24 Billion", The Wall Street Journal (October 2, 1985), page 3.
13 bid., page 3.
14 Nancy Giges, "Stage set for Agency Reviews at P&G-Vicks", Advertising Aae
(October 6, 1985), page 1 and 92.
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which was described in chapter 1. Specifically, it follows under
the "multiproduct multidivision clients". This policy is more strict
than the A.A.A.A.'s policy which defines competition in a narrow
sense. Under P&G policy, two products are competitors if they are
in the same division, while under A.A.A.A.'s policy, the products
have to be direct competitors.
In order to analyze how Procter & Gamble has applied its policy
on conflicts, it is important to discuss P&G in two different
situations. First, after P&G merged with Richardson Vicks. Second,
after Saatchi & Saatchi merged with Bates.
A. Procter & Gamble Conflicts after Mergina with Richardson
'Vicks
Procter & Gamble acquisition of Richardson Vicks created
several conflicts with the advertising agencies for the Richardson
Vicks' $160 million advertising budget. The main conflict created
by this merger was with Young & Rubicam. Y&R handled an
estimated $40 million in Richardson Vicks billings. Y&R handled
the Richardson Vicks products which included the Oil of Olay line
of moisturizing products as well as Formula 44D cold and cough
medicine and Tempo antacid. Y&R also directed some $120 million
worth of Colgate business worldwide. The products that Y&R
handled for Colgate Palmolive included: Irish Spring, Fresh Start,
Ajax Light Duty Liquid and Dentagard. Table 2.2 provides a
divisional structure of Colgate-Palmolive.
-19-
Table 2.2
Colgate-Palmolive Divisional Chart
Colgate-Palmolive
Household and Personal Care Health Care Specialty marketing
The Oil of Olay product was in P&G's Bar Soap and Household
Cleaning Products Division. The Irish Spring is a soap and directly
competed with Oil of Olay (also a soap). Also Fresh Start and Ajax
Light Duty Liquid were in conflict with other P&G products in the
Bar Soap and Household product division. So, there was a conflict
since the Colgate products competed with P&G products in the
same division.
This created a conflict when P&G acquired Richardson Vicks,
since P&G and Colgate Palmolive are major competitors, and after
the acquisition, Y&R had both competitors on its roster.
Two years before this merger, Y&R dropped P&G, after 34 years
together, because of P&G's hard line on conflicts was keeping the
agency from accepting new business. Then, Y&R took Colgate
Palmolive $124 million account. Y&R was better off as one of
Colgate's two global agencies instead of being only one in Procter's
vast stable of agencies.
The conflict arising from the P&G-Vicks merger was resolved
by P&G exercising its corporate-conflict policy. P&G fired Young &
-20-
Rubicam. Procter & Gamble then moved the $28-million Oil of Olay
domestic account to Wells, Rich, Greene (US), and the $30 million
European account went to Saatchi & Saatchi Compton International.
Vicks Formula 44 ($12 million billings) joined the rest of that line
at D'Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles. Tempo antacid ($5 million) went
to Leo Burnett, which already handled health-and personal-care
products for P&G.
Before this acquisition, P&G had chosen to overlook the over-
the-counter drugs that P&G agency D'Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles
(DMB&B) handled for Richardson Vicks including Vicks Nyquill and
Day-Care cold medicines, Sinex sinus remedy, Cremacoat cough
medicines, Vicks cough drops, and Clearasil cough medicine. In this
case, there was a conflict before P&G acquired Richardson Vicks,
since the Richardson Vicks products were in the same division as
the P&G products. The P&G products that DMB&B had were P&G
drugs, such as Pepto-Bismol stomach remedy and Norwich aspirin
which were in the Personal Care Products Division. Although there
was a conflict in this case, P&G decided to continue working with
the agency since P&G had had very good relations with DMB&B.
Therefore P&G was being selective in applying its policy on
conflicts, since it was very strict with Y&R while it is more
tolerant with DMB&B.
Another conflict took place with Pantene. Pantene was owned
by Richardson-Vicks. Pantene, which markets shampoos and
conditioners in department stores has minimal share strength in
the United States but has a strong international presence. Leber
Katz Partners had been the longtime agency for Pantene, but Leber
-21-
Katz merged with Foote, Cone & Belding's New York office (FCB).1 5
FCB is one of the major agencies for Procter & Gamble arch
rival Colgate Palmolive. FCB handled the following Colgate-
Palmolive products: Dynamo, Fluorigard, Fab Detergent, Ultra Brite
Toothpaste, and Ajax All Purpose Cleaner. The Pantene product is in
the P&G's Personal Care Product Division. In this case, the Colgate-
Palmolive products did not conflict with P&G products in the
Pantene division, but in a different division, The Bar Soap and
Household Product Division.
FCB/Leber Katz Partners already had had to resign new-
products assignments that the agency has been working on for P&G,
because of P&G's concern with having its competitor Colgate
Palmolive also working with FCB/Leber Katz. However in this
case, Procter & Gamble continued working with the agency. So P&G
did not contradict its policy in this case, since the Colgate-
Palmolive products did not compete with products in Pantene
Division, but in a different division.
Procter and Gamble did not apply its policy on conflicts in a
consistent manner. It favored the agencies with whom it had had
good business relations, while it was very strict with others. This
fact was demonstrated in the P&G conflict with Vicks, before the
P&G acquisition, since P&G decided to continue working with the
DMB&B agency with whom it had had strong relations. On the other
hand, it was very strict with Y&R, and ended up firing it.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the P&G conflicts.
15 Tom Delaney, "P&G May Pull $20-Million Pantene From FCB/Leber Katz",
Adweek (October 20, 1985), page 8.
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Table 2.3
Procter & Gamble Conflicts
P&G Product ComP. Product P&G Aencv Com. Agency Resolution/Budget
Colgate: Irish
Spring,
Fresh Start,
Ajax Light Duty.
Colgate
Y&R
Leber Katz
Y&R P&G fired agency
with $28 million
account in June
1986.
FC&B P&G stayed with
agency.
Dishwashing
Detergent.
Baked Goods,
Duncan Hines.
Crisco
Luvs baby pants
Food Products.
Colgate
Palmolive
Dishwashing.
Saatchi
Baked Goods Saatchi
Cookie & Crackers
(Nabisco)
Stayfree Sil-
houettes
(J&J Napkins).
Maxim Mellow
Roast. (G.F.)
DFS
Dorland
Saatchi
Bates
DFS
Compton
Bates
Colgate resigned
100 million
account 5/86.
P&G resigned
$70 million
account 9/86.
P&G resigned
$30 million
account 9/86.
General Food
withdrew $25
million account,6/86.
Ivory Bar
Liquid Soap.
Pinesol. Saatchi Bates Bates resigned
Pinesol $25
account 1/87.
-23-
Oil of Olay
Pantene
B. Procter & Gamble Conflicts After the Saatchi & Saatchi
Merger with Bates
The merger of Bates with Saatchi & Saatchi created several
conflicts involving Procter & Gamble.
The major conflict created by this merger was between P&G
and Colgate-Palmolive. Colgate-Palmolive had its $100 million
advertising account with Ted Bates Worldwide. Procter & Gamble, a
major competitor with Colgate-Palmolive, is Saatchi & Saatchi's
main customer. Bates had handled the Colgate account for 48
years.
Saatchi & Saatchi Compton handled in 1986 $173 million worth
of P&G business in the U.S. including Tide powder and liquid laundry
detergents, Cascade dishwasher detergent, Ivory soap, Comet
cleaner, Top job cleaner, Crisco shortening and oil, Duncan Hines
(muffins, cakes mixes, frostings, cookie mixes and brownies), and
High Point coffees.16 The only product category that conflicted at
both agencies was dishwashing liquid, since Bates handled
dishwashing liquid for Colgate-Palmolive while Saatchi & Saatchi
served P&G. Therefore, this conflict is with products in the same
P&G division, The Bar Soap and Household product division.
This conflict was resolved by Colgate-Palmolive withdrawing
its $100 million advertising account from Ted Bates Worldwide
inc. Colgate said it would consolidate all its advertising with the
two other agencies it already worked with. Foote, Cone & Belding
Communications Inc. Chicago was assigned Palmolive dishwashing
16 Stewart Alter and Nancy Giges, "P&G, Colgate Strike Back", Advertising Age
(June 2, 1986), page 1.
-24-
liquid, with $7 Million in 1985 measured media, the Ajax brand, and
Dentagard plaque fighting toothpaste. Colgate toothpaste (with $31
million spent in measured media in 1985), went to Young &
Rubicam Inc. Y&R was also assigned Colgate toothbrushes and
Palmolive Rapid Shave. Colgate's billings world-wide totaled about
$300 million.
These account shifts not only removed Bates from Colgate
accounts in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and six countries in the Asian
Pacific, but also ended the relationship with Colgate which dated
back to 1940.
Many agency combinations are structured so that acquired
agencies continue to operate separately within an umbrella
company. However in the Saatchi-Bates case, Colgate Palmolive did
not believe the umbrella company resolved the conflict. Colgate
believed the two agencies merged under the umbrella concept were
still the same company, and was concerned that confidential
information might reach Procter and Gamble.
A second conflict that occurred after this merger was that
Bates handled several basic food accounts including baked goods,
cookies and crackers for Nabisco. Saatchi & Saatchi Compton also
handled Procter & Gamble food products division, consisting of
Duncan Hines baked goods and Crisco'Oil. Here there was a conflict
since Saatchi & Saatchi and Bates had competing products within
P&G's Food Product Division.
This conflict was resolved by Procter & Gamble withdrawing
some $20 million in Duncan Hines baking mix line, and some $35
million in Crisco oil and shortening billings from Saatchi &
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Saatchi. Crisco and Crisco Oil went to Grey Advertising inc., New
York, and Duncan Hines baking mix line went to Cunningham & Walsh
Inc., New York.
A third conflict involving Procter & Gamble, was a paper
product conflict. Saatchi & Saatchi subsidiary, DFS Dorland,
managed Bounty (a $10 million account), and Luvs Baby Pants (a
$20 million account). Johnson & Johnson's Stayfree Silhouettes
sanitary napkins were at Compton.1 7 Here there was a conflict
between P&G and Johnson & Johnson since both market sanitary
napkins. Also, Bates' subsidiary, William Esty Co., also had
Stayfree feminine hygiene products from Tambrands. However the
conflict that worried P&G the most involved Johnson & Johnson.
Procter & Gamble moved $20 million in billings of Luvs Baby
Pants, and $10 million of Bounty Paper Towels from DFS Dorland
New York, to resolve this conflict. Luvs Baby Pants went to Leo
Burnett USA, Chicago. Bounty Paper Towel was shifted to Jordan
Manning Case, Taylor & McGrath, New York. So, P&G reinforced its
stance on agency conflicts by moving $85 million in billings from
the Saatchi & Saatchi agencies to other P&G agencies.
P&G also conflicted with General Foods. Both companies are
competitors in the Coffee Products Division. General Foods had its
two coffee brands, Maxim and Mellow Roast at Bates. The conflict
was resolved by General Foods withdrawing its $25 million
account from Bates, but according to Advertising Age, this
departure was an "internal business decision" unrelated to the
agency having become part of the Saatchi empire. No further
17 Stewart Alter and Laurie Freeman, "P&G Trims Saatchi Sails", Advertising Age
(September 15, 1986), page 1.
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information was available on the specific reason of this account
shift.
The last P&G conflict was that Bates' Pine-Sol $25 million
account conflicted with P&G cleaning products assignments, since
Bates' sister agency, Saatchi & Saatchi's Compton handled Ivory bar
and liquid soap. This conflict was resolved by Bates dropping the
$25 million account.
"Procter & Gamble has told its agencies it will not accept the
agency holding concept as a way to accommodate what it perceives
as conflicts. P&G would not allow its agencies to handle any
product that competes with a P&G product from a division with
which the agency works even if there are not direct product
conflicts within the agency. "18 This statement considers two or
more agencies of the same umbrella company as the same agency.
In all these cases arising from the Saatchi-Bates merger, P&G
has been very consistent in applying its tough policy on conflicts.
All of these situations involved products that compete with other
P&G products within the same division, and P&G ended up
withdrawing the account, or forcing the agency to withdraw the
competing account in each case. By these actions P&G was
demonstrating, that it was standing firm against appeals that it
modify its U.S. "divisional" account-conflict policy.
18 Nancy Giges and Stewart Alter, "Bates Drops Cyanamid, Avoids P&G Conflict",
Advertising Age (January 19, 1987), page 1.
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2.2. PHILIP MORRIS
Philip Morris Inc. is a New York-based Tobacco and beverage
company. Its main tobacco lines are: Marlboro, Virginia Slims,
Merit, Players, Cambridge, Parliament Lights and Philip Morris
regular. Table 2.4 provides a divisional structure of Philip Morris
before the acquisition of General Foods.
Table 2.4
Philip Morris Divisional Chart
Philip Morris Co.
Philip Morris Miller Brewing Seven Up Industrial
(Tobaccgo
Philip Morris had been the least diversified of the large tobacco
companies before it acquired General Foods, and it also had been
the most successful in acquiring customers for its brands,
particularly Marlboro, the number one selling cigarette in the
world. Only 8% of Philip & Morris earnings derived from nontobacco
operations, despite $4.2 billion in nontobacco assets in Seven-Up
Co. and Miller. Brewing Co., according to Diana K. Temple, tobacco
analyst with Salomon Brothers in New York.1 9
19 William Gloede and Nancy Giges, "PM-GF Rumors Top Week", Advertising Age
(September 16, 1985), page 128.
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On November 1, 1985, Philip Morris purchased 45.3 million
shares, or 97.7% of General Foods Corporation. Philip Morris
acquired General Foods for $5.67 billion, or $120 a share. This
acquisition created the largest consumer-products company in the
U.S. at that time, with about $23 billion of annual sales.
General Foods, the largest U.S. company that was strictly in the
food and beverage business, had a reputation for being bureaucratic
and stodgy. But many consultants and analysts believed it had made
progress in the past few years. They suggested that General Foods
was becoming more aggressive, pointing to its introduction of
several successful products such as Jell-O pudding pops, a frozen
dessert, and Crystal Light powered beverage mixes.2 0
Table 2.5
General Foods Divisional Chart
General Foods Divisions.
Birds Eye Meals Desserts Breakfast Beverage Maxwell Food
Foods House Services
Hamis Maxwell, chairman of Philip Morris concluded that
General Foods was the best purchase. Maxwell argued that General
Foods offered the best entry into the food business "It has a
diversified product line, and it has available all forms of
20 Trish Hall, Philip Zweig and John Williams, "General Foods' Stock Price Jumps
Again on Speculation of a Leveraged Buyout", The Wall Street Journal (September 26,
1985), page 3.
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distribution." He also emphasized that General Foods would remain
independent with all divisions intact and would operate with its
current managers and employees as a separate company within the
Philip Morris structure. For a divisional structure of General Foods
please see table 2.5.
General Food agreed a few months before the acquisition that in
some cases its agencies could handle competitors products. No
stated conflict policy was found, however Adweek expected Philip
Morris would let the General Foods agencies continue working with
tobacco and beer accounts.
In order to analyze the conflicts involving Philip Morris, it is
important first to address the conflicts that occurred after the
acquisition of General Foods. Finally I will analyze the Philip
Morris conflicts that arose following the advertising agency
megamergers.
A. Philip Morris Conflicts after Merging with General Foods
The first conflict occurred with R. J. Reynolds. Young & Rubicam
was a major General Food agency with an estimated $100 million
in billings. Y&R handled GF's Sanka and International Coffees, Jell-
O-brands, Birds Eye, frozen foods and other products. These
products were in the Breakfast, Birds Eye Agricultural and Dessert
Divisions.
Young & Rubicam also served R.J.R. as the agency for Canada
Dry and Kentucky Fried Chicken. Reynolds is Philip Morris' biggest
U.S. tobacco rival. However, Canada Dry is a beverage product, and
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the conflicts arose with products in different divisions. The same
logic would apply to Kentucky Fried Chicken. Finally, Y&R continued
working with both products.
A second conflict that arose was at Leo Burnett USA, Chicago.
Leo Burnett handled cigarettes for Philip Morris and 7-Up. This
agency also handled Kellogg Co., Pillsbury Green Giant frozen foods
and Peter Eckrich & Sons meats -all competitive with General Food
products. 21 Leo Burnett was a major agency for Pillsbury and
handled Green Giant and Totino's Pizza. However, these products do
not conflict with Philip Morris (the cigarette business), but did
compete with General Foods which is a different division of Philip
Morris. So, in this case there was really not a conflict inside the
division, and the agencies continued handling both accounts.
A third Philip Morris conflict occurred at Backer & Spielvogel.
This agency which had Philip Morris' Parliament cigarettes and the
Miller Brewing Company beer account, also handled Quaker cereals
and Gatorade. However this conflict was not in the same division,
because the Cereals and Gatorade did not compete with the
cigarettes or beers. Backer & Spielvogel continued working with
both accounts.
A last conflict occurred at Wells, Rich, Greene. This agency
handled Philip Morris' Benson & Hedges and Players products. Wells,
Rich, Greene Inc. also handled Ralston Purina Co. products. This
conflict also involved products in different divisions, and the
agencies continued working with both companies.
Table 2.6 provides a summary of all Philip Morris conflicts.
21 Janet Neiman, "Conflicts Surround General Foods Bids", Adweek (September 30,
1985), page 8.
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Table 2.6
Philip Morris Conflicts
PM Product Comp. Product PM Aencv Comp. Agencv Resolution/Budget
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Sanka,
Int. Coffees
Jell-O-Brands
Bird Eyes
Frozen Foods
Canadian dry
Kentucky Fried
(R.J. Reynolds)
Y&R Y&R Continue with
both accounts.
7-Up and
cigarettes.
7-Up and
cigarettes.
Parliament
Miller Brewing.
Benson &
Hedges Player.
Billsbury Green
Giant Frozen F.
-Peter Eckrich
Son Meats.
Quaker Cereal
and Gatorade.
Wilston Purine.
Leo Burnett
Leo Burnett
Backer Spiel-
vogel.
Wells. Rich,
Greene.
Leo Burnett
Leo Burnett
Backer Spiel-
vogel.
Wells, Rich
Greene.
Continue with
both accounts.
Continue with
both accounts.
Continue with
both accounts.
Continue with
both accounts.
Maxim Mellow.
Miller Brewing
Parliament
Food products
(P&G)
Michelob
Anheuser-Bush
Wistom-Salem
RJR
Saatchi
Backer
Spielvogel
Backer
Spielvogel
Bates
Bates
Esty
General Food
withdrew $25
million account
on June 86.
Anheuser-Bush
resigned $38
million account on
June 86.
RJR resigned
$50 million
account in June 86.
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The rest of the conflicts in table 2.6 will be analyzed in the
next part.
All of these situations arising after the Philip Morris'
acquisition of General Foods involved products competing in
different divisions. There was not enough information available on
the size of the accounts, nor on the resolution of the conflicts.
However, I have found consistency in the way the Philip Morris
conflicts were resolved. In all of these conflicts, Philip Morris did
not resign the account nor force the agency to drop the competitor
account.
B. Philip Morris Conflicts after the Saatchi & Saatchi Merger
with Bates
The first conflict occurred between General Foods and Procter
& Gamble after the Saatchi & Saatchi merger with Bates, which
was previously discussed in the P&G section. As noted there, the
conflict was resolved by General Foods shifting its Maxim coffee,
and Mellow coffee brand from Bates. However, as mentioned
before, according to Advertising Age, this account shift was not
related to the conflict with Procter & Gamble.
A second conflict which arose at Saatchi & Saatchi involved
Anheuser-Busch. Bates handled Anheuser-Busch's Michelob beer,
which is an RJR's division. Backer & Spielvogel, acquired by Saatchi
& Saatchi, handled Miller Brewing, a Philip Morris subsidiary. Here,
there was a conflict since all these products are in the brewery
business. The conflict was finally resolved by Anheuser Busch
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withdrawing its $38 million Michelob account from Bates.
A third conflict that occurred after the Saatchi & Saatchi
merger with Bates was with cigarette products. Bates' move to
the Saatchi network roster resulted in three cigarette companies
in the Saatchi & Saatchi camp. Philip Morris had its Parliament at
Backer Spielvogel, Lorillard had its True brand at DFS Dorland and
R.J. Reynolds had its Salem brand at Bates' subsidiary, William Esty
Co.22 In order to resolve this conflict, R. J. Reynolds pulled Salem
cigarettes estimated $50 million account from Esty which moved
to FCB/Leber Katz Partners. RJR Nabisco Winston-Salem N.C. also
pulled $96 million from Bates' William Esty Co. unit and another
$32 million. RJR was one of Esty's initial accounts 34 years ago.2 3
So Philip Morris did not seem to have a strong policy on
conflicts. It continued working with the agencies (Bates, and Esty)
in two of the three conflicts. It only resigned its account from
Bates in the Philip Morris-P&G conflict at the Saatchi & Saatchi
Umbrella. However, according to Advertising Age (as mentioned
before), this account shift was an "internal business decision"
unrelated to the Saatchi-Bates merger.
2.3. R. J. REYNOLDS
R.J. Reynolds is primarily a cigarette company which have
22 An Advertising Age Roundup, "Saatchi Conflict Approach Faces Big Test",
Advertising Age (May 12, 1986), page 107.
23 An Advertising Age Roundup, "Saatchi Omnicom Losses Mount", Advertising Age
(June 30, 1986), pgs.1 and 70.
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diversified into other areas in recent years. The company also owns
Del Monte Inc., Heublein Inc., and Kentucky Fried Chicken. Table 2.7
shows the different product divisions of RJR.
Table 2.7
R.J.R. Divisional Chart
R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Food Beverages Others
In 1984, R.J.R. sold its major non-consumer products units, Sea
Land Inc., an ocean shipping company, and Aminoil Inc., an energy
business. Reynolds' then acquired Sunkist Soft Drinks Inc, a Canada
Dry corp.
On June 1985, R.J.R. decided to acquire Nabisco Brand Inc. This
merger made R.J.R.-Nabisco the largest consumer products company
selling products like cigarettes, Life Savers, Kentucky Fried
Chicken, and Oreo Cookies. This acquisition appeared to accomplish
Reynolds' ambition for a global presence.
Reynolds paid $4.9 billion in cash, preferred stock and senior
debt securities, and the combined company had sales of more than
$19 million at that time. Reynolds offered about $85 cash a share
for as much as 51% of Nabisco's common stock. Each remaining
Nabisco share was exchanged for $42.50 in new senior debt
securities and $42.50 of a new preferred stock with a stated value
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of: $42.50. 24
"Nabisco had a reputation of being colorless and conservative,
but before the merger, the Company has won praise from analysis
for its responses to attacks on its cookie turf." 2 5 Nabisco Brand's
products included: Ritz Crackers, Oreo Cookies, Planters Nuts,
Fleishmann's and Blue Bonnet Margarines, cereals, candies and
other products. For the divisional chart, please see table 2.8.
Table 2.8
Nabisco Divisional Chart
Nabisco Divisions
Biscuit All Brand Food Margarine Planters Grocery Vinegar Fleischmann
Importers. Services Products
Apparently R.J. Reynolds does not have a written policy on
conflicts, but did RJR indeed have a policy by which it evaluated
agencies. From RJR actions, it is implied that their policy was
similar to PG's conflict policy. "While its agency roster included
shops that handled products competitive with its own, in the same
division, it is widely believed in the agency business that Reynolds
liked shops that avoided conflicts."2 6
24 Ed bean and Trish Hall, " R.J. Reynolds Agrees to Acquire Nabisco Brands Inc, In
Bid Totaling $4.9 Billion in Cash, Stock and Debt", The Wall Street Journal ( June 3,
1985), page 3.
25 bid., page 3.
26 William Gloede, "RJR/Nabisco Would Top Ad List", Advertising Age (June 30,
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A. R.J. Reynolds Conflicts after Meraina with Nabisco
There were several conflicts which occurred at Dancer
Fitzgerald Sample. DFS used to be an RJR agency until 1979, when
it lost the then-$40 million account. This agency handled $69
million in Nabisco billings with such products as Almost Home, and
Chips Ahoy and Chewy Chips Ahoy cookies, as well as Life Savers
products. These products were in the Biscuit and Life Saver
division. There were potential conflicts with several accounts
which are important to address:
1- DFS handled an estimated $65-70 million in billings from
ILorillard's True Cigarettes which competed with R. J. Reynolds
tobacco. However, this conflict involved competing products in
different divisions. DFS handled Nabisco's products that were on
the Nabisco Biscuit and Life Saver division. On the other hand,
Lorillard 's products at DFS were cigarettes.
2- DFS also worked for Wendy's, a competitor of RJR's Kentucky
Fried Chicken (officially a subsidiary of RJR's subsidiary Heublein).
This conflict did not contain products from the same division,
since Wendy's (a fast food products) was not competing with the
Biscuit and Life Saver divisions.
3- The agency also handled S&W Fine Foods, a rival of RJR's Del
Monte Foods. This conflict also involved products in different
divisions.
1985), page 102.,
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4- The last conflict at DFS involved Guilt Wineries & Distillers
a competitor of Heublein's Inglenook wines in some segments.
Again, as in the other three cases, this product did not conflict
either with products in the Life Saver or in the Biscuit division.
So, all the conflicts involving DFS did not involve an agency
handling competing products in the same division. DFS continued
handling both accounts, in all four cases.
A second conflict took place at Doyle Dane Bernbach. DDB was
an agency for Nabisco with $20 million in billings. It handled Blue
Bonnet and Fleischmann's margarines, Fleischmann's yeast, Cream
of Wheat and ready-to-eat cereals. These products were in the
Fleischmann Division.
This agency also worked for Brown & Williamson Tobacco and
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons liquor, and their combined billings
amounted to $50 million.27 B&W's Kool competed with RJR's
Salem, and Seagram with Heublein in several categories. However,
the conflicts did not involve products in the same division, since
beer and wine did not compete with margarines. Although the
agencies continued working with both products after the RJR-
Nabisco merger, it resigned $15 million in billings after the
Needham-Doyle Dane Bernbach merger which will be discussed in
part B of this section.
The third conflict involved Bozell & Jacobs which worked with
Nabisco's Planters Peanuts, snacks and candy bars (i.e.,
Butterfingers and Baby Ruth) all worth about $30 million. These
products were in the Nabisco Planters and LifeSavers divisions.
27 Christy Marshall, "An RJR/Nabisco Merger Could Make History in Terms of
Potential Conflicts", Adweek (June 10, 1986), page 2.
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This agency also handled James Beam Distilling, (which competed
indirectly with Heublein $6 million) and McDonald's franchises
(about $25 million). This is another conflict involving products of
different divisions, since neither McDonalds nor the distilling
competed with any products on the Planters and Lifesavers
division. As in the other conflicts, both accounts continued to be
handled by Bozell & Jacobs.
A fourth conflict due to the RJR-Nabisco merger occurred at the
Bloom Agency, New York. All Brand Importers, a division of
Nabisco, whose beer brands included Moosehead, Foster's Lager and
Dos Equis had its account at Bloom. The agency also handled
Glenmore Distilleries. Bloom's major Glenmore brands included
Amaretto di Saronno, Kentucky Tavern Straight Bourbon Whiskey
and Mr. Boston Schnapps. 2 8 All of these products directly
competed with All Brand importers' (RJR subsidiary) wines, and the
conflict was between products competing in the same division.
This conflict was resolved by All Brand Importers withdrawing its
account from the Bloom Agency. The billings which were about $5
million, were shifted to the McCann-Erickson agency.
A final conflict which was previously described in the Philip
Morris section occurred with RJR, in the Y&R agency. As noted
earlier, this conflict did not involve products in the same division,
and Y&R continued working with both accounts.
Table 2.9 provides a summary of the conflicts involving RJR-
Nabisco.
28 Debbie Seaman, "Bloom Beerless After Conflicts Brewed", Adweek (January 13,
1986), page 4.
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Table 2.9
R. J. Reynolds Conflicts
RJR Product Comp. Product RJR Agency Comp. Agency Resolution/Budget
Life Savers,
Chip Ahoy,
Almost Home.
Blue Bonet,
Fleischmman,
Margarine, Cream
of Wheat, Ready
To-Eat-Cereals.
Planters,
Peanuts,
Snacks and
Candy Bars.
Moosehead,
Foster's Lager
Dos Equis
(Brand Imports).
Sanka,
Int. Coffees
Jell-O-Brands
Bird Eyes
Frozen Foods
1- Lorillard's
True Cigarette.
2- Wendy's
3- S&W Fine
Foods.
4- Guilt Wine-
ries distilled.
-Brown Wil-
liams Tobacco.
-Joseph Seagram
Sons Liquor.
-James Bean
Distilling.
-Anheuser-
Bush.
-Glenmore-
Distilleries.
-Anheuser-
Busch.
Canadian dry
Kentucky Fried
(R.J. Reynolds)
DFS DFS
DDB
Bozels &
Jacobs.
Bloom
Y&R
DDB
Bozels
Jacobs.
Bloom
Y&R
Agency
continued with
all accounts.
Agency
continued with.
all accounts.
Agency
continued with
all accounts.
Brand Imports
resigned $5
million account
on Jan. 86.
Agency
continued with
both accounts.
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Comp. Aencv Resolution/Budget
Baked Goods,
Cookie and
Crackers.
Baked Goods
Duncan Hines.
Crisco. (P&G)
Saatchi DFS P&G resigned
$70 million
account 9/86.
Wistom-Salem
RJR
Parliament
Ready-To-Eat General Mills
Cereals, Cream Cereals.
of Wheat,
Fleischmann.
Backer
Spielvogel
DDB
Esty
Needham
RJR resigned
$50 million in
June 86.
Nabisco resigned
$26 million account
on August 86.
These RJR conflicts were resolved in a very consistent matter.
I-very time the conflict was between products in different
divisions, the agency was allowed to continue working with both
accounts. However, in the Bloom Agency's conflict in which the
conflict occurred between products in the same division, then the
conflict was resolved by RJR withdrawing its account.
B. RJR Conflicts After the Saatchi & Saatchi Merger with Bates
There were three conflicts after this merger which were
described before. The first was with P&G, and involved competing
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RJR Product
products of the same Food division. As explained previously, the
conflict was resolved by P&G pulling some $20 million in Duncan
Hines baking mix line, and some $35 million in Crisco oil and
shortening billings from Saatchi & Saatchi.
The other two conflicts were covered in the Philip Morris
section. One involved competing products in the brewing industry
(Anheuser-Busch's Michelob an RJR Miller brewing). The conflict
was finally resolved by Anheuser Busch withdrawing its $38
million Michelob account from Bates. The last conflict had products
competing in the cigarette division: Philip Morris' Parliament, and
RJR's Salem. As I mentioned before, this conflict was solved by
Salem cigarettes removing the estimated $50 million account from
Esty.
C. RJR-Nabisco Conflicts After the BBDO-DDB-Needham Merger
The first conflict arising from this merger occurred with
General Mills. General Mills had an estimated $50 million of
billings at Needham, including its Wheaties, Hamburger Helper and
Bisquick brands. Nabisco had an estimated $25 million at DDB,
including Fleischmann's and Blue Bonnet margarines, Cream of
Wheat and ready-to-eat cereals, and Eggbeaters. The General Mills
products were in conflict with Nabisco cereals in the Fleischmann
division. The conflict was resolved by DDB resigning Nabisco $26
million cereal products account, because of pressure from General
Mills. RJR-Nabisco moved the account to Foote, Cone & Belding.
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All the conflicts created by the two mergers were resolved by
either RJR resigning its account or the competitor, but in any case,
the agencies were not allowed to handle one product that competed
with another in the same division. It seemed that RJR was very
strict in this type of conflict.
2.4. CONCLUSION
The policies followed by Procter and Gamble and R. J. Reynolds
were the same. Both companies did not allow an agency to handle
any product that competed with any brand in the company division
of the assigned product. However, while R. J. Reynolds was
consistent in applying its policy on conflicts, P&G was selective.
Procter and Gamble did not move its account from the agency if
they had had very good relations.
Philip Morris was very different from the other two companies,
and did not appear to have a strong policy on conflicts. Philip
Morris continued working with the agencies in all situations except
in the Maxim Mellow-P&G conflict. However, according to
Advertising Age, General Food's withdrawal of the Maxim Mellow
account from Bates was not related to this conflict.
Also, the conflicts which occur after agency megamergers
involved direct competing products in two or more agencies of an
umbrella company. This was one reason why conflicts which
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occurred after agency mergers were resolved in every case, by one
of the conflicting accounts being dropped by the agency, or the
agency being fired by the client. Procter and Gamble in particular
was very strict in conflicts after agency megamergers, while it
was more flexible in conflicts that occurred after the P&G-Vicks
merger. Although the policies that each client follow after each
type of mergers were the same, there was a general tendency to
apply the conflict policy more rigorously after agency
rnegamergers.
To predict the outcome of a conflict, the first thing is to
determine the kind of conflict policy a client has, and how
consistent it is in applying it. If the client has a strong policy and
is consistent, then it will not allow an agency to have competing
accounts. It will fire the agency, or make the agency resign the
competing account. On the other hand, if the company is not
consistent in applying its policy, then the history of the relations
between the client and the agency should be examined. If the
relationship has been very strong, then chances are that the client
is going to overlook the conflict.
When a client has a rigid policy and decides to be strict with
the agency, then either the client will fire the agency, or the
agency drop the competing account. In this situation, the most
important factor in deciding the resolution of the conflict is the
account size, and the past agency-client relationship. A client will
prefer to be fired by the smaller client rather than resign a bigger
account. This can be seen in the P&G-Colgate conflict at Young &
Rubicam. Y&R preferred to stay with Colgate-Palmolive and be
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fired by P&G, since the Colgate-Palmolive budget at that agency
was much higher. So the client which has a larger budget tend to
stay with the agency.
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CHAPTER 3
ADVERTISING AGENCIES MERGERS
The three-way combination of BBDO, Doyle Dane Bernbach and
Needham Harper created Omnicom which, for a short time, formed
the world's largest agency. But then Saatchi & Saatchi added Ted
Bates, and became number one. These, and the many other
combinations have restructured the industry, sending it off in new,
and uncertain direction.
In this chapter, two very important mergers in the advertising
agency industry will be described. First the conflicts and account
shifts created by each of these mergers will be analyzed, as well
as the resolutions of each of these conflicts. At the end of the
chapter, the conflicts produced by the two mergers will be
compared, and contrasted with those discussed in chapter 2.
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3.1 THE MERGER OF NEEDHAM HARPER. BBDO. AND DOYLE
DANE BERNBACH
Doyle Dane Bernbach Group, Needham Worldwide and BBDO
International agreed on April 1986 to create a new agency holding
company that immediately would become the biggest in the world.
It had billings of more than $5 billion and gross worldwide income
of $736 million.
This new agency replaced the Interpublic Group of Cos., with its
$4.7 billion in billings and worldwide gross income of $707, as the
largest agency holding company. BBDO was the sixth largest U.S.-
based agency in the world with $2.5 billion in billings, while DDB
was 12th at $1.7 billion and Needham was 16th at $847 million.2 9
BBDO holders received under the merger agreement 65% of the
holding company's 24 million shares, Doyle Dane holders got 24%,
and Needham Harpers received 11%. The new group included two
subsidiaries: BBDO Worldwide and DDB Needham Worldwide. In
addition, the three companies general advertising and marketing
services was operated as the Diversified Agency Group.3 0
These agencies wanted to use the umbrella holding company
concept to avoid conflicts that arose after the merger. Each agency
of the holding company was going to be operated independently and
the agencies thought they could convince advertisers that the
29 Stewart Alter, "Biggest Global Agency: DDB-Needham-BBDO", Advertising Age
(April 28, 1986), page 1.
30 Hank Gilman, "Holding Company to Have Billings of $5 Billion; Stock Swap Is
Planned", The Wall Street Journal (April 28, 1986), page 1.
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agencies of the holding company would operate separately.
Advertising agencies thought they could grow by acquiring more
agencies and adding new accounts, and that advertisers were going
to accept this idea. However, as discussed later, most of the
clients did not accept the umbrella holding company. Advertisers
still thought that two or more agencies of a holding company were
the same enterprise. Clients remained concerned about
confidentiality of their information and strategy, and about the
exclusivity of agency services and talent.
The two problems that the Omnicom group were concerned
before making this deal were: (1) How many clients would they lose
as a result of conflicting accounts? (2) How to manage the
financial part of the deal? Analysts involved in the planning of the
Omnicom merger calculated carefully the account losses they
would have and therefore found few surprises. 3 1 This is a sharp
contrast to Saatchi & Saatchi's attitude which (as will be
discussed in the next section) did not take into account before
mrnerging with Bates, the heavy losses that would occur, and was hit
very hard with account losses after the Saatchi-Bates merger.
Conflicts After the Meraer of BBDO. Doyle and Needham
There were several conflicts caused by this merger. Table 3.1
provides a summary of these conflicts.
311 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, page 104.
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A. General Mills Conflicts
General Mill conflict policy was that "its agencies should not
handle any other account that competed in the same category".
General Mills also refused to use an agency group that does any
work for Quaker Oats, according to Adweek. 3 2
The first conflict was with Quaker Oats Co. Quaker Oats Co. had
$20 million in billings at BBDO of Quaker 100% Natural, Puffed Life
Cereals and Puss'n Boots. These products conflicted with the
General Mills cereals of the Betty Crocker division at
DDB/Needham. General Mills put a lot of pressure on the agency to
resign the account. The conflict was resolved by BBDO resigning
the $20 million Quaker's account, following pressure from General
Mills, and terminating their 13-year relationship.
A second conflict was with Pillsbury. Pillsbury billed an
estimated $20 million at BBDO's New York office with products
that included Frosting, Supreme and Refrigerated Pie Crust
business, cakes and bread mixes, pie crusts, microwavable food
lines and artificial. These products were in conflict with General
Mills' Betty Crocker division's cakes mixes and frosting at BBDO's
Omnicom sister shop, DDB/Needham, Chicago, with about $50
million in billings. The conflict was resolved by Pillsburry moving
its $20 million in cakes and frosting to Young Rubicam.
The last General Mill conflict was with Nabisco (please see the
Nabisco section). As I said before, this conflict involved products
in the cereal division, and was resolved by the agency resigning the
32 Tom Delaney, "General Mills on Conflict Issue; The Ball is in the Agencies' Court",
Adweek, June 16, 1986, pages 1 and 8.
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RJR-Nabisco account, because of pressure from General Mills.
All of these conflicts were of the conglomerate competition
type, which was defined in chapter 1, specifically of "the Mega or
Multinational Agency" kind of competition.
In all the three conflicts, General Mills put pressure to the
advertising agency to resign the competitor account. All the three
conflicts were resolved by either the agency dropping the General
Mills competitor account, or the competitor resigning the account.
General Mills was consistent in applying its policy in the conflicts
created by the Omnicom merger.
What determined here which account was resigned was the
account size and its potential for growth. Since General Mills had a
bigger account than its competitors with these agencies ($50
million in billings for General Mills vrs. $20 and $25 million for
the competitors), and General Mills account had a much better
prospect for growth, so the agency preferred to retain General
Mills account.
B. Campbell Soup Conflict
Campbell had a reputation of being open-minded about client
conflicts, according to Adweek. Campbell Soup had about $20
million in billings at Needham. The products included: Campbell's
Bean products, Swanson Canned Foods & Franco American, Superiori
Ravoli & Casa Brava Mexican Frozen Dinners.
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Table 3.1
Conflicts after the BBDO-BBD-Needham Merger
Product X Comp. Product Aenc X Comp. Aency Resolution/Budget
GENERAL MILLS QUAKER OATS: DDB
1- Betty Crocker
(cereals)
2- Cakes, Mixes
and frostings.
3- Cereals
CAM PBELL
SOUPS:
Frozen dinner
products.
STROH
BREWERY:
Old Milwaukee.
HONDA:
Automobiles.
100% Natural,
Puffed Cine
Cereals.
PILLSBURY:
cakes, bread
mixes and
pie crusts.
NABISCO:
Ready-To-Eat,
Cream of Wheat,
Fleischmann.
H.J. HEINZ:
Ore-Ida Line
of frozen food,
Weight Watchers.
ANHEUSER-
BUSCH:
Budweiser,
Michelob Light.
CHRYSLER:
Dodge Cars &
Trucks.
BBDO
DDB and
Needham.
Needham
Needham
BBDO
Needham
BBDO
DDB
DDB
Needham
BBDO
BBDO resigned
$20 million
Quaker's account
on July 86.
Pillsbury
resigned $20
million account
in 86.
Nabisco resigned
$26 million account
on Aug. 86.
Agency continued
with both accounts.
Stroh Brewery
resigned $100
million account
on May 86.
Honda resigned
$55 million
account on May
86.
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Comp. Aaencv Resolution/Budget
SEAGRAM
DISTILLERS:
Whiskey and
Rums.
BRISTOL-
MYERS.
'Tickle and
Excedrin.
NATIONAL
DISTILLERS:
Gim, Vodka
and Rum.
GILLETTE:
Razors, anti-
perspirants.
DDB
DDB
BBDO
BBDO
Agency
continued with
both accounts.
Agency
continued with
both accounts.
Its big rival, H.J. Heinz, had more than $30 million in billing at
DDB including the Ore-Ida line of frozen foods, and Weight
Watchers International. There was a conflict since both company
products were frozen foods, and were in the same division.
However, Campbell decided to keep an estimated $10 million in
billings at the BBDO side of the mega-agency.33 So Campbell
accepted the fact that the two agencies were going to be run
separately, and both companies continued working with the
agencies.
C. Brewery Conflicts
This conflict was between Stroh Brewery Co. and Anheuser
Busch. Stroh Brewery had its $70 million account at BBDO,
including Old Milwaukee beer and corporate assignments. Anheuser
3 3 Tom Delaney, "Short-Term Pains: BBDO Loses $200 Mil", Adweek (May 5,
1986;), page 4.
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Product X
Busch had its $100-million account at Needham including
Budweiser and Michelob Light. So, after this merger, there were
going to be two products which were direct competitors (beer).
This is another case of conglomerate competition of mega or
multinational agencies, involving direct competing products. The
conflict was resolved by Stroh Brewery withdrawing its $70
million account from BBDO to Grey Advertising.
In this case, the advertising agency preferred to retain the
large account, the Anheuser Busch account. It realized that the
Busch account was more important to the Omnicom group, and the
only way of' solving the conflict was by Stroh Brewery switching
its account. Stroh brewery probably resigned the account before
the agency withdrew itself.
D. Automobile Conflicts
This conflict was between Honda and Chrysler. American Honda
had its $55 million Automobile Division account at Needham
Harper. Chrysler had its account at BBDO including Dodge Cars &
Trucks. This created a conflict, since after the merger, the agency
would have competing automobile products. The policy both
companies used seemed not to allow directly competing products in
one agency, or in two or more agencies of an umbrella company.
They were strict in enforcing this policy, so both accounts could
not stay at the umbrella company. This conflict was resolved by
American Honda withdrawing its $55 million account from
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Needham Harper Worldwide, demonstrating that the Japanese were
very strict with mergers and account conflicts The account was
moved to Rubin/Postaer & Associates, L.A.
E. Other Conflicts
There were other clients that decided to stay with their
agency, in spite of conflicts. Seagram had substantial DDB billings
including Crown Royal Canadian Whiskey, Kessler American
Whiskey, Leroux Cordials and Captain Morgan Spiced Rum.
Seagram's competitor, National Distillers, had several products at
BBDO including Gilbey's Gin, Gilbey's Vodka, Gilby's Rum. These two
companies were competing in the same division. However, Seagram
decided to remain with DDB/Needham, while National Distillers
stayed at BBDO. So, these two companies accepted the concept that
the two agencies were going to be run separately.
A final conflict occurred between Bristol-Myers and Gillete.
Bristol-Myers with an estimated $30 million account at DDB
including, Tickle and the Excedrin Line. Gillette had several
products at BBDO including its razors, anti-perpirants, etc.
Bristol-Myers and Gillette agreed to continue working with both
agencies.
Although no information was available on the reason why these
companies continued working with the Omnicom Group, it can be
inferred these two companies did not object to conglomerate
competition.
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Conclusion
In most of these conflicts, one of the companies ended up
resigning their account from the Omnicom merger, or putting
enough pressure on the advertising agency to resign the account.
This fact can be evidenced primarily by the firm position on
conflicts by General Mills.
However, there were other companies like Campbell Soups,
Seagram Distillers and Bristol Myers which decided to stay with
their agencies, despite having competitors in the same division. So,
these companies accepted the umbrella concept, and the
proposition that the agencies were going to be run separately.
The reactions of the companies to conflicts created after
agency mergers depended on the policy a client had on conflicts,
and how often it enforced it. While General Mills refused to accept
the umbrella concept, other companies studied in this section
allowed the agency to handle competing accounts in the umbrella
company.
3.2 THE MERGER OF SAATCHI & SAATCHI WITH TED
BATES WORLDWIDE
Saatchi & Saatchi agreed to acquire Bates on May 12, 1986 for
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$450 million, creating the world's largest advertising agency at
that time. Saatchi paid an initial $400 million for Bates, which
was the third largest agency in the United States in 1986. Saatchi
& Saatchi paid an additional $50 million in 1988 to about 200
employee shareholders of closely-held Bates to complete the
transaction. 3 4 In this sale, Robert Jacoby, Bates Chairman, made
a profit of $112 million.3 5
This combination created an agency with more than 50-blue
chip clients an annual billings totalling $7.5 billion. The Bates
acquisition "fulfill our strategic objective to ensure the company's
position as one of the market leaders in advertising", said a Senior
Saatchi official. "To be outside is to be increasing vulnerable to
any downturns in advertising revenue in the future", he said. Robert
Jacoby, Bates chairman and one of its major shareholders, saw that
both agencies together would be the strongest force in the
advertising industry. Analysts added that the move will sharply
increase Saatchi's billings in the US.3 6
Saatchi & Saatchi started its big US expansion in 1982, when it
acquired the Compton agency for $57 million. A year later Saatchi
& Saatchi bought Mccaffrey & McCal and became strong in the US
market. As with other acquisitions, Saatchi said Bates would
continue to operate as an independent entity within the Saatchi
Group, with its own management and international network.
According to Saatchi & Saatchi, "no communication, nor transfer of
34 Craig Forman, "Saatchi & Saatchi Agrees to Buy Bates", The Wall Street Journal
(May 12, 1986), page 1.
35 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, page 133.
36 Craig Forman, "Saatchi & Saatchi Agrees to Buy Bates", The Wall Street Journal
(May 12, 1986), page 1.
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personnel or knowledge would exist between the agencies of the
Saatchi Group".3 7
The principal reason Saatchi & Saatchi acquired Bates was to
grow by attracting package goods advertisers as clients -the type
of advertisers that make agencies really big. Agencies like J.
Walter Thompson and Young & Rubicam grew by attracting products
like soaps, detergents, soups, candies and colas. These type of
products paid for television programming and gave advertising
agencies huge profits.3 8
However, According to Nancy Millman "In their haste to achieve
dominance, the Saatchis failed to investigate the condition of the
agency they were buying, They did not weigh client reactions, never
plotted a worst case scenario in terms of client defections, and
were ignorant of the management turbulence that Robert Jacoby
(Bates Chairman) had fostered for years".3 9 Bates officials did not
take any step to test client reactions to this merger in advance. As
will be discussed later, there were many account departures after
this merger which the Saatchi & Saatchi group did not predict and
which caused them heavy losses in terms of money, people and
clients. Therefore, the expansion of the Saatchi & Saatchi Group
and the personal enrichment of Bates executives seemed more
important than the close relationship that had been a tradition in
the advertising industry.4 0
37 Ibid., page 1.
38 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, page 27.
39 bid., pages 128 and 129.
40 .id page 134.
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Conflicts After the Merger of Bates with Saatchi & Saatchi
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the Saatchi & Saatchi
conflicts. Besides the several P&G conflicts created by the merger
of Saatchi and Bates, (which were discussed in the P&G section),
there were other conflicts.
A. Mars Inc. Conflicts
There were several conflicts after the merger involving Mars
Inc. The first one involved M&M candies. Bates handled M&M/Mars
candies, with billings exceeding $100 million worldwide. Rowntree
had its $15 million account at Saatchi & Saatchi. Rowntree was in
direct conflict with Mars inc. since both companies then had
candies in the same agency. Finally, Mars pressure the Saatchis
until the agency resigned the Rowntree candy account.
Another source of conflict involving Mars was that Saatchi &
Saatchi was involved in an estimated $50 million in billings at
DFS/Dorland, half of which was for gum and candy brands.41 DFS
also handled Cadbury-Schweppes' Peter Paul brands in competition
with Mars. The Cadbury Schweppes group had Schweppes mixers and
carbonated drinks business in the U.S., having bought Canada Dry,
Sunkist and a share in Dr. Pepper, in 1986.
Mars appeared to have a policy like Procter and Gamble, and
41 Tom Delaney, "Saatchi Still Must Satisfy Mars and General Mills", Adweek
(September 15, 1986), page 8.
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considered two or more agencies of a holding company, as the same
agency. So, Mars did not accept that the umbrella company would
protect the confidentiality of information. Although Saatchi &
Saatchi tried to retain Mars by giving up $14 million in
international billings from Nestle-owned Carnation pet foods and
Rowntree Mackintosh, the U.K. confectionary products giant. Mars
ended up withdrawing its account to resolve its several conflicts
created by the merger.
B. General Mills Conflict
Another conflict involved General Mills and Quaker Oaks. Backer
& Spielvogel, an agency bought by Saatchi & Saatchi handled about
$55 million in Quaker Oats Co. business. The products at Backer
Spielvogel were Quaker's Cap'n Crunch, Corn Bran and Instant
Oatmeal brands, as well as the granola-bar items. Campbell-Mithun
(Bates) had $30 million in General Mills' billings in cereal products.
Here there was a conflict since both General Mills and Quaker Oats
had cereal products at the Saatchi & Saatchi agencies. General
Mills complained to the Saatchis about the perceived client
conflict. The conflict was resolved by Saatchi & Saatchi selling the
Backer & Spielvogel agency to its local management group, which
as an independent agency under the name of Bayer, Bess,
Vanderwarker & Flynn continued to handle the Quaker account. 42
The kind of conflicts involving General Mills after the Saatchi-
Bates merger and following the Omnicom Merger, were exactly of
the same kind. All of them were direct competing products in two
42 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, page 139.
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agencies of an umbrella company.
General Mills continued enforcing its tough policy on conflicts
by forcing the Saatchi & Saatchi group to sell the Backer
Spielvogel agency.
C Warner Lambert Conflict
Bates created ads for Warner Lambert's Trident sugarless gum,
Bubblicious gum and Dynamints, with $64 million in billings. This
conflict with Saatchi's DFS/Dorland Inc. unit's Carefree Sugarless
Gum, Bubble Yum Gum and Breath Savers, all Life savers Inc.
products. This conflict was created by direct competing products
in two agencies of an umbrella company. Melvin Goodes, president
of Warner Lambert, was very upset about Jacoby $112 million
profit, and about Bates failure to inform Warner Lambert about the
merger beforehand, so the company could have time to prepare for a
new agency. 4 3
This conflict was resolved by Warner Lambert dropping its
accounts from Bates and moving it to JWT and Y&R. The JWT Group
Inc. got about $34 million in billings, and Young Rubicam close to
$30 million. Warner Lambert terminated its 20 years relationship
with Bates in the United States, the decision on whether to remain
with Bates overseas was left to Warner Lambert management in
each country. From Warner Lambert actions, it can be inferred that
they were not going to allow direct competing products in two or
more agencies of an agency group.
43 Nancy Millman, Emperors of Adland. New York: Warner Books, 1988, page 133.
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D. Cidarette Conflicts
The merger also caused conflicts in the cigarette business
which I previously discussed in the Philip Morris section. The
conflict was resolved by Salem and RJR withdrawing the accounts.
E. Brewery Conflicts
There were also conflicts in the brewery business in Germany.
Bavaria's St. Paul beer was handled by Hamburg-based Scholz &
Friends which was 51% owned by Bates. Saatchi & Saatchi handled
Hamburg-based Holsten brewery in West Germany. The account
involved $1 million of billings for Holsten Edel beer.4 4 Both
products competed in the brewery business. The conflict was
resolved by Folstein brewery firing Saatchi & Saatchi from its $1
million account because of conflicts.
Another conflict involved Anheuser-Busch, (which was
previously discussed in the Philip Morris conflict after mergers
section.) The conflict was finally resolved by Anheuser Busch
removing its $38 million Michelob account from Bates.
These brewery conflicts were of direct competing products in
the same agency group, and neither of these companies believed in
the umbrella company concept.
44 Laurel Wentz, "Saatchi Slowing Down", Advertising Age, (November 17, 1980),
page 64.
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Table 3.2
Conflicts after the Saatchi & Saatchi-Bates Merger (Except the
Procter & Gamble Conflicts)
Product X Comp. Product Agen. Agency Resolution/Budget
MARS
M&M, gums
and candy
bars.
1- ROWNTREE
candies.
2- CADBURY
SCHWEPPES:
mixers & car-
bonated drinks.
Bates
DFS
Dorland.
Saatchi
DFS
Mars resigned
$100 million
account at the
Saatchi &
Saatchi network
in July 86.
GENERAL
MILLS:
Cereal Products.
QUAKER OATS
Cap'n Crunch,
Corn Bran,
Instant Oatmeat,
Granola Bar.
Campbell- Backer
Mithun (Bates). Spielvogel
Saatchi & Saatchi
sold the agency
( Backer
Spielvogel).
WARNER-
LAMBERT:
Trident, Sugar-
less Gum.
COMMODORE:
International
Account.
BAVARIA ST.
PAUL: beer.
(Germany)
PHILIP
MORRIS:
Miller Brewing.
LIFE SAVERS:
Buble Yum Gum,
Breath Savers,
Carefree Sugar-
less Gum.
IBM: Entry
Systems &
Service Device.
HOLSTEN
BREWERY:
(Germany)
ANHEUSER-
BUSCH:
Michelob.
Bates
Bates
Scholz &
Friends
(Bates)
Backer
Spielvogel
DFS
Saatchi
Saatchi
Bates
Warner-Lambert
resigned $64
million account
in July 86.
Commodore
resigned $110
million account.
Holsten resigned
$1 million account
in October 86.
Anheuser-Bush
resigned $38 mil-
lion account 6/86.
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Resolution/Budet
PHILIP
MORRIS:
Parliament.
BMW:
Automobiles.
AMERICAN
CYANAMID:
Breck Shampoo
& Old Spice.
RJR:
Wistom-Salem
JAGUAR:
Automobiles.
HELENA
CURTIS:
Industry Suave
Haircare Line.
Backer
Spielvogel
Scholz &
Friends.
Bates
Esty
Saatchi
Backer &
Spielvogel.
RJR resigned
$50 million
account in June 86.
Scholz & Friends
issued
confidentiality
agreements on
Aug 86.
Bates resigned
American
Cyanamid account
on January 87.
F. Automobile Conflicts
Another conflict created by this merger in Germany was
between Jaguar and BMW. The Jaguar account was handled by
Saatchi & Saatchi in the U.K. Schloz & Friends (50% owned by
Bates) had the $22 million BMW account in Germany. Although both
companies are in different countries, their products are
competitors, and in the same product category (automobiles).
BMW, which traditionally uses smaller agencies, threatened to
bolt Scholz & Friends, one of the hottest breakaway agencies in
Europe , if the agency did not maintain its independence from
Saatchi. 4 5 To solve this conflict, Scholz & Friends took the
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Com. ProductProduct X
unusual step of issuing "confidentiality agreements" to BMW, and
possibly to other clients to assure that no information would be
passed between Scholz and Saatchi.
The resolution of this conflict was very interesting because
BMW did not believe the umbrella company was going to protect the
confidentiality of its information. So, the confidentiality
agreements were overcoming the shortcomings of the umbrella
concept, since they protected the transfer of BMW confidential
information between agencies of an agency group, which was BMW's
main concern.
G. Other conflicts
The last conflict was between. American Cyanamid and Helen
Curtis. Bates handled American Cyanamid's Breck Shampoo and Old
Spice fragrances. Backer & Spielvogel handled Helena Curtis
Industries' Suave Haircare line and DFS handled its Finesse. Here
there was a conflict in the same division, since the Breck Shampoo
conflicted with Helena Curtis' Suave Haircare line. This conflict
was resolved by Bates resigning the American Cyanamid business
and the Breck haircare lines (the estimates of the account billings
are unavailable). So from these actions, it appeared the policy of
Helen Curtis was not to allow competing products in two or more
agencies of an umbrella group, and competition was defined as
Procter and Gamble did.
45 Dagmar Mussey & Julie Skue Hill, "Saatchi Accord Saves Account", Advertising
Ae, (August 4, 1986), page 3.
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Conclusion
In the majority of the conflicts created by this merger, one of
the conflicting companies ended up withdrawing the account from
the Saatchi & Saatchi agencies to resolve the conflict. So, the
companies did not agree with the umbrella concept.
However, there were two exceptions in the way the conflicts
were resolved: First, The General Mills and Quaker Oats conflict,
where the agency was sold by the Saatchi Group. Second, the
automobile conflict in Europe, when BMW made the Scholz &
Friends issue "confidentiality agreements to BMW, to assure that
no information would be passed between Scholz and Saatchi.
These two exceptions did not mean these companies accepted
the umbrella company. General Mills forced Saatchi & Saatchi to
sell the Backer & Spielvogel agency. BMW did not accept this
concept either until it was protected by a written agreement that
no information was going to be given to the competitor's agency.
However, the Saatchi & Saatchi group was hit very hard by
account losses. The Saatchis did not take into account how clients
were going to react to a Bates-Saatchi merger, and ended up
loosing more than $300 million in accounts. If they would have
analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of merging with Bates,
they never would have paid that very high price for Ted Bates.
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3.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The major difference between these two mergers was in the
expectations these mega-agencies had about client acceptance of
the umbrella concept. While the Omnicom group carefully analyzed
the account losses involved in the merger, the Saatchi group
apparently only cared about becoming the biggest agency, and did
not take into consideration all the account losses. The Saatchis
thought that the clients were going to accept the umbrella concept,
and were given a slap in the face by the advertisers.
Also, the reactions of the advertisers was more strong to the
Saatchi-Bates merger than to the Omnicom merger. Bates clients
were very upset about Robert Jacoby's (Bates Chairman) $112
personal profit, and about how little he seemed to care about the
clients. This may be one of the main reasons why the Saatchi &
Saatchi Group ended up losing almost all the conflicting accounts
studied, and even selling its Backer Spielvogel agency. The
Omnicom Group, on the other hand, was able to retain a larger
number of its conflicting accounts.
The conflicts involved after these mergers were, for the most
part, directly competing products in one or more agencies of an
umbrella company. These are different from the conflicts after
clients mergers which were of the "multiproduct-multidivision"
type of competition. This was one reason why a larger proportion
of the account conflicts were resolved in shifting agencies after
-66-
agency mergers than after clients mergers. Most of the clients did
not accept directly competing products within the same umbrella
company.
The reaction of each client to account conflicts was different
and depended to a greater extent to its policy and how it enforced
it. For example R. J. Reynolds was very strict in applying its policy
in conflicts arising from agency mergers as well as in conflicts
after client mergers. Others like Procter & Gamble were more
strict in conflicts arising from agency mergers, and complained
much about the Saatchi-Bates merger.
The policies the clients applied in this type of conflicts appear
to be similar to the A.A.A.A. policy with one modification. These
clients defined several agencies of an umbrella company as one
agency. Clients for the most part were not going to allow directly
competing products, nor competitors within the same division, in
two or more agencies of an umbrella company. Most of these
companies (except Campbell Soup, Seagram Distillers, and Bristol
Myers) rejected the umbrella concept, and resigned their account or
forced the advertising agency to withdraw the competing account.
Only Campbell Soup, Seagram Distillers, and Bristol Myers which
did not appear to have a strict policy on conflicts decided to stay
in the Omnicom group. However, most advertisers did not believe
the umbrella concept was going to protect the confidential
information.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This chapter will start by answering the research questions
posed in chapter 1. Then, at the end of this chapter,
recommendations for clients and advertising agencies will be
given, as well as suggestions for further study of this topic.
4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. What Tvyes of "Conflicts" Arose?
There was a big difference in the conflicts that arose after
clients mergers than those after clients mergers. Those conflicts
that occurred after clients mergers were for the most part of
conglomerate competition, specifically of the multiproduct-
multidivisional type. The majority of the conflicts that took place
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after agencies megamergers contained direct competing products
in two or more agencies of an umbrella group.
B. How Were the Conflicts Resolved?
The most common way of resolving these conflicts was by one
or more of the clients involved in the conflict withdrawing its
account from the advertising agency, or the agency resigning one of
the accounts. In other situations, the clients involved in a conflict
decided to keep their account at the advertising agency. There were
only two exceptions to this ways of resolving conflicts. One was
when BMW made its agency (Scholz & Friends, a Saatchi & Saatchi's
agency) issue confidentiality agreements. The other case was a
General Mills conflict, which forced the Saatchi & Saatchi Group to
sell the Backer Spielvogel agency to solve the General Mills-Quaker
Oats conflict.
C. Is There Any Relationship Between the Type of Conflict and
.the Manner of Resolution?
No significant relationship was found between the type of
conflicts and its resolution. In the conflicts arising after clients
mergers, most of the conflicts were cases of conglomerate
competition. Some of these conflicts were resolved by the the
client dismissing the account from the agency, or the agency
resigning the account. In other cases, both accounts stayed at the
advertising agency. So, the resolution of these conflicts depended
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of the conflict policy followed by the clients, and how consistently
the policy was applied.
The conflicts arising after agency mergers were for the most
part directly competing products in two or more agencies of an
umbrella group. Their resolution in the same type of conflict was
different and depended more on the company policy and on which of
agency group was involved. For example, almost all the directly
competing accounts that arose after the Saatchi-Bates merger
were resolved by the client resigning the account, while in the
Omnicom conflicts, the advertising agency was able to retain more
accounts.
D. Are There Differences in the Source of Conflicts Between
Client vrs. Aaencv Mergers?
Most of the conflicts after client mergers were cases of
conglomerate competition, especially of the "multiproduct
multidivision clients" type of conflicts. On the other hand, the
conflicts arising after agency mergers involved directly competing
products present in two or more agencies of an umbrella group.
E. Have Consistent Policies on Conflicts Emerged?
In conflicts arising after clients mergers, Procter & Gamble
and R. J. Reynolds had the same policy on conflicts. Both of them
would not allow an agency to handle products that competed with
any of their products within the same division. Although R. J.
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Reynolds applied this policy in a consistent matter, Procter &
Gamble was more flexible with agencies with whom it had had good
relations. Philip Morris seemed to be less concerned about
conflicts, and would allow its agencies to handle directly
competing accounts.
In conflicts arising after agency mergers, most of the clients
(except Campbell Soup, Seagram Distillers, and Bristol Myers) used
a policy of not allowing directly competing products in the same
umbrella company. However some clients like Campbell Soup,
Seagram Distillers, and Bristol Myers did not have a strong policy
on conflicts and allowed directly competing products in the same
agency group.
The two agencies groups studied were different in the way they
handled conflicts. The Omnicom Group was more concerned about
clients and was able to retain some of the conflicting accounts.
'The Saatchi & Saatchi Group apparently did not care too much about
its clients, and ended up losing almost all its conflicting accounts.
F. Were the A.A.A.A. Policy Guidelines and Procedures Followed
in These Cases?
The A.A.A.A. policies were not enough to define account
conflicts in the majority of the cases. In conflicts arising after
clients mergers, a policy like that of Procter & Gamble was used
more often by P&G and R. J. Reynolds. These companies were not
only concerned about direct competed products. They were concern
about a rival whose products competed with any of the client's
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product in the same division. So, the A.A.A.A. policy was too narrow
to resolve conflicts arising after clients mergers.
In conflicts arising after agency megamergers, the A.A.A.A.
policy was also inadequate. Most of the companies broadened the
A.A.A.A. policy, and defined all agencies of an umbrella company as
one. These companies did not believe the agencies of an umbrella
company were separate, and the two clients concerns of protecting
confidential information and assuring exclusivity of agency
services were not satisfied. P&G, for example, rejected the
A.A.A.A. policy because it refused to accept "conglomerate
competition" and won't tolerate the umbrella concept. Therefore,
most of the companies did not follow the A.A.A.A. policy, as
discussed above, in dealing with conflicts arising after agency
megamergers.
4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations I give to clients is to have a policy on
conflicts and apply it consistently in all cases. Also, I suggest that
clients like Procter & Gamble should soften their policy to include
only directly and indirectly competing products. A very strict
policy can restrict agencies growth, as well as clients' flexibility
to choose advertisers. A big agency serving Procter & Gamble
cannot add many other advertisers to its roster, since P&G has so
many products, and it is very easy to have a P&G's conflict with
another client.
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To advertising agencies I suggest to carefully evaluate
beforehand the advantages and disadvantages of growing by
acquiring other advertising agencies. Agencies should be more
concerned about the clients reactions to a merger, and not only
about making a huge profit like Ted Bates or becoming the largest
advertising agency, as Saatchi & Saatchi did. If the advantages of
acquiring another agency outweigh the losses in client defections
and people, then the agency should go ahead and merge. A failure to
do a careful evaluation could result in an agency paying a very high
price for acquiring another agency, in the form of heavy account
losses.
4.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
Further studies about this subject are needed to better
understand the reactions of clients to mergers in the advertising
industry. Also, it would be useful to know more about clients'
stated policy on conflicts as well as the exact reasons for firing,
or continuing to work with an agency. Some of the account shifts
attributed to mergers might have occur because of other reasons
such as client's prior dissatisfaction with an agency's performance
and the conflicts might then have been used as an excuse to fire an
agency. These findings might alter the conclusions reached in this
study.
Although some of this information will never be provided by the
-73-
companies since it can affect their relations with agencies in the
future, a better understanding of the subject can be gained by
interviewing directly the marketing people of each company, and
finding out their opinions about these issues.
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